1. Introduction {#sec1-sensors-19-03598}
===============

With the recent advances in wireless sensor networks and embedded technologies, internet of things (IoT) connects objects and shares various useful data with internet through resource-constrained devices to provide convenient services for users such as smart home, healthcare, vehicle to everything and smart gird. However, a single server environment also is inefficient for IoT because an ocean of data is generated by resource-constrained devices such as microsensor, RFID tag and smart cards.

Cloud computing is a distributed computing mechanism for a large-scale data and allows sharing resources among all of the servers and users. The cloud computing provides five essential characteristics: *on-demand self-services*, *ubiquitous network access*, *rapid elasticity*, *measured service* and *resource pooling* \[[@B1-sensors-19-03598],[@B2-sensors-19-03598]\]. *On-demand self-service* handles cloud services without human interaction and *ubiquitous network access* controls access service using standard protocols. *Rapid elasticity* and *measured service* optimize the resource usage. *Resource pooling* provides cloud service using homogeneous infrastructure among service users. The cloud computing deals with an ocean of data generated by devices and sensors and provides data managing service for users through these essential characteristics.

However, these services are vulnerable to potential attacks by malicious adversaries because they are provided through an open channel, including sensitive data of legitimate user about location, health, payment, etc. Therefore, a secure and efficient authentication for IoT environment has become essential security requirements to provide useful services to user.

In 1981, Lamport \[[@B3-sensors-19-03598]\] proposed one factor user authentication scheme using passwords to ensure user's privacy. However, security of the password based authentication scheme is easily broken because its security only relies on the passwords. In 2002, Chien et al. proposed two factor authentication scheme to overcome this security flaw using password and smart cards. However, their scheme is vulnerable to smart card stolen attack as the data stored in smart cards can be extracted by power analysis attacks \[[@B4-sensors-19-03598]\]. When a malicious adversary obtains smart cards and password, they can perform various attacks such as impersonation, replay and insider attacks. To overcome the above-mentioned security weaknesses, three-factor authentication schemes have been proposed \[[@B5-sensors-19-03598],[@B6-sensors-19-03598],[@B7-sensors-19-03598]\]. Biometrics (e.g., face, retina, fingerprint, iris, etc.) have several important characteristics: they cannot be lost or forgotten; they are hard to forge, copy, share or distribute; and they are difficult to guess.

In 2019, Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\] demonstrated that the previous scheme is vulnerable to insider, off-line guessing and disclosure attacks and proposed enhanced IoT-based authentication scheme in cloud computing environment. This paper demonstrates that Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not withstand impersonation, session key disclosure and replay attacks. We also show that their scheme does not achieve secure mutual authentication and anonymity. Moreover, we propose a secure and lightweight three-factor authentication scheme for IoT in cloud computing environment to resolve these security weaknesses, considering computational costs.

1.1. Adversary Model {#sec1dot1-sensors-19-03598}
--------------------

We present the Dolev--Yao (DY) model \[[@B9-sensors-19-03598]\] to evaluate security of ours and previous schemes, which is widely accepted as security threat model. The detailed description of the DY model is as below:A malicious adversary can modify, intercept, delete or insert the transmitted messages via an open channel. A malicious adversary can obtain or steal the smart card of legitimate user and can extract the data stored in the smart card by using power-analysis \[[@B4-sensors-19-03598]\].A malicious adversary can perform various attacks such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), replay, impersonation, and session key disclosure attack \[[@B10-sensors-19-03598],[@B11-sensors-19-03598]\].

1.2. Our Contributions {#sec1dot2-sensors-19-03598}
----------------------

Our contributions in this paper are as follows. We demonstrate that Pelaez et al.'s scheme is not secure against various attacks such as impersonation, session key disclosure and replay attacks and does not achieve secure mutual authentication and anonymity.We propose a secure and lightweight three-factor authentication scheme for IoT in cloud computing environment to address the security shortcomings of Pelaez et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme withstands impersonation, session key disclosure, and replay attacks and achieve secure mutual authentication and anonymity. Moreover, the proposed scheme is more efficient than Pelaez et al.'s scheme because it utilizes only bitwise exclusive or (XOR) and hash operations.We prove that the proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication using the Burrows--Abadi--Needham (BAN) logic \[[@B12-sensors-19-03598]\] and perform an informal security analysis to prove that our scheme is secure against various attacks such as MITM, impersonation, replay and session key disclosure attacks. Furthermore, we compare the security properties and performance of proposed protocol with other related schemes.We perform a formal security analysis using the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) simulation tool to prove that the proposed protocol resists the MITM and replay attacks.

1.3. Organization {#sec1dot3-sensors-19-03598}
-----------------

We introduce the related works and review Pelaez et al.'s scheme in [Section 2](#sec2-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"} and [Section 3](#sec3-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}. In [Section 4](#sec4-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"} and [Section 5](#sec5-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, we cryptanalyze Pelaez et al.'s scheme and propose a lightweight IoT-based three-factor authentication scheme in cloud computing environment to enhance the security shortcomings of Pelaez et al.'s scheme. [Section 6](#sec6-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"} and [Section 7](#sec7-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"} prove the security of proposed scheme and present the simulation analysis using AVISPA. In [Section 8](#sec8-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, we compare the security properties and performances of proposed protocol with other related schemes. Finally, [Section 9](#sec9-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"} concludes the paper.

2. Related Works {#sec2-sensors-19-03598}
================

In last few decades, numerous authentication and key agreement schemes have been proposed to ensure privacy of user, considering resource-constrained environments such as wireless sensor networks, global mobility networks and vehicular networks \[[@B3-sensors-19-03598],[@B13-sensors-19-03598],[@B14-sensors-19-03598],[@B15-sensors-19-03598],[@B16-sensors-19-03598],[@B17-sensors-19-03598],[@B18-sensors-19-03598],[@B19-sensors-19-03598]\]. In 1981, Lamport \[[@B3-sensors-19-03598]\] firstly proposed a lightweight password based user authentication scheme to provide secure communication. However, Lamport's scheme has low security level because its security only relies on passwords. In 2002, Chien et al. \[[@B13-sensors-19-03598]\] presented a two-factor user authentication protocol using smart card and password to resolve this problem. Unfortunately, the two-factor authentication schemes using password and smart cards cannot ensure user's privacy \[[@B13-sensors-19-03598],[@B14-sensors-19-03598],[@B15-sensors-19-03598],[@B16-sensors-19-03598],[@B17-sensors-19-03598],[@B18-sensors-19-03598],[@B19-sensors-19-03598]\], when the data stored in token (e.g., smart card, mobile device, etc.) are compromised.

Later, several authentication and key agreement schemes for IoT have been presented in various fields \[[@B20-sensors-19-03598],[@B21-sensors-19-03598],[@B22-sensors-19-03598]\]. However, these environments are not suitable for IoT because it cannot handle a large number of data. In 2019, Zhou et al. \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\] presented a lightweight IoT-based authentication scheme in cloud computing environment to overcome this issue. Zhou et al. claimed that their scheme can prevent various attacks such as insider, forgery and tracking attacks and provide secure mutual authentication and session key security. However, in 2019, Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\] pointed out that Zhou et al.'s scheme \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\] cannot withstand insider, off-line guessing and session key disclosure attacks and provide secure mutual authentication. To resolve these security problems, Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\] presented a lightweight IoT-based authentication scheme in cloud computing environment. They also claimed that their scheme is secure against off-line password guessing, insider, impersonation and replay attacks.

3. Review of Pelaez et al.'s Scheme {#sec3-sensors-19-03598}
===================================

We briefly review Pelaez et al.'s IoT based authentication scheme in cloud computing environment. Their scheme comprises of three processes: registration, authentication, and password change. These processes are presented as below (for details, see \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\]).

3.1. User Registration Process {#sec3dot1-sensors-19-03598}
------------------------------

In Pelaez et al.'s scheme, a new user $U_{i}$ is registered from control server $CS$ via a secure channel. [Figure 1](#sensors-19-03598-f001){ref-type="fig"} shows the user registration process of Pelaez et al.'s scheme. In [Figure 1](#sensors-19-03598-f001){ref-type="fig"}, $U_{i}$ sends the registration request to $CS$ and then $CS$ issues the smart cards.

3.2. Cloud Server Registration Process {#sec3dot2-sensors-19-03598}
--------------------------------------

In Pelaez et al.'s scheme, a cloud server $S_{j}$ is registered from control server $CS$ via a secure channel. [Figure 2](#sensors-19-03598-f002){ref-type="fig"} shows the cloud server registration process of the Pelaez et al.'s scheme. In [Figure 2](#sensors-19-03598-f002){ref-type="fig"}, $S_{j}$ sends the registration request to $CS$ and then $CS$ sends parameters $B_{2}$ and $B_{3}$ to $S_{j}$.

3.3. Login Process {#sec3dot3-sensors-19-03598}
------------------

When $U_{i}$ wants to access the service, $U_{i}$ firstly sends login request message to $S_{j}$. In [Figure 3](#sensors-19-03598-f003){ref-type="fig"}, $U_{i}$ sends login request messages $\left\{ T_{U}^{new},D_{1},PID_{i},D_{2} \right\}$ to $S_{j}$, and then $S_{j}$ sends the messages $\left\{ T_{U}^{new},D_{1},PID_{i},D_{2},T_{S}^{new},D_{3},PSID_{j},D_{4},D_{5} \right\}$ to $CS$ in order to check validation of $U_{i}$.

3.4. Authentication Process {#sec3dot4-sensors-19-03598}
---------------------------

After finishing the login process, $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$ and $CS$ perform mutual authentication with each entity, and then $U_{i}$ and $S_{j}$ can share the session key $SK_{U - S}$. [Figure 4](#sensors-19-03598-f004){ref-type="fig"} shows the authentication process of the Pelaez et al.'s scheme.

4. Cryptanalysis of Pelaez et al.'s Scheme {#sec4-sensors-19-03598}
==========================================

In this section, we demonstrate that Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not resist replay, session key disclosure and impersonation attacks and show that their scheme does not achieve secure mutual authentication and anonymity.

4.1. Impersonation Attack {#sec4dot1-sensors-19-03598}
-------------------------

The impersonation attack is that a malicious adversary try to impersonate as a legitimate user. When a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ may attempt to impersonate a legal user, $U_{MA}$ can easily generate the login request message of $U_{i}$. According to [Section 1.1](#sec1dot1-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, $U_{MA}$ can obtain smart card of $U_{i}$ and can extract the data $\left\{ PID_{i},C_{2},C_{3},C_{4},h\left( n_{U} \right) \right\}$ stored in smart card. Furthermore, $U_{MA}$ intercepts the message transmitted via an open channel. Finally, $U_{MA}$ performs the impersonation attack as below:**Step** **1:**A malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ can compute real identity $ID_{i} = C_{2} \oplus D_{1}$ of legitimate user $U_{i}$ and $h\left( n_{U}^{new} \right) = D_{2} \oplus C_{3}{\oplus h(}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i})$. Then, $U_{MA}$ generates timestamp $T_{MA}^{new}$ and random nonce $n_{MA}^{new}$, computes $D_{2MA} = C_{3}{\oplus h(}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i}{) \oplus h}\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right)$, and sends $\left\{ T_{MA}^{new},D_{1},PID_{i},D_{2MA} \right\}$ to the $S_{j}$.**Step** **2:**Upon getting the message from $U_{MA}$, the $S_{j}$ generates random nonces $T_{S}^{new}$ and $n_{S}^{new}$ and computes $D_{3} = B_{2} \oplus SID_{j}$, $D_{4} = B_{3}{\oplus h(}T_{S}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}{) \oplus h}\left( n_{S}^{new} \right)$ and $D_{5}{= h\left( PI \right.}D_{i}{||}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}{||}T_{S}^{new})$. Then, the $S_{j}$ sends $\left\{ T_{MA}^{new},D_{1},PID_{i},D_{2MA},T_{S}^{new},D_{3},PSID_{j},D_{4},D_{5} \right\}$ to the $CS$.**Step** **3:**Upon getting the message from $S_{j}$, the $CS$ computes $C_{2}^{\ast}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( PI \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}\left. \left| \middle| x \right) \middle| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}{\left| \middle| y \right))}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}{\left| \middle| x \right) \oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}\left| \middle| y \right)$, $ID_{i}^{\ast}{= h\left( PI \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}\left. \left| \middle| x \right) \middle| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}{\left| \middle| y \right))}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}{\left| \middle| x \right) \oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}\left| \middle| y \right) \oplus D_{1}$ and $C_{1}^{\ast}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| PI \right.D_{i})$. Then, the $CS$ checks whether $C_{1}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}C_{1}$. If it is valid, the $CS$ authenticates $U_{MA}$. Then, the $CS$ computes $h\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right)^{\ast}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| PI \right.D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}\left. \left| \middle| x \right) \middle| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}{\left| \middle| y \right))}^{\ast} \oplus PID_{i}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( x \middle| \middle| y \right) \oplus h(}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i}^{\ast})^{\ast} \oplus D_{2}$. After that, the $CS$ computes $SID_{j}^{\ast}{= h\left( PSI \right.}D_{j}^{\ast}\left| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}\left. \left| \middle| z \right) \middle| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}{\left| \middle| y \right))}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}{\left| \middle| z \right) \oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{CS}\left| \middle| y \right) \oplus D_{3}$ and $B_{1}^{\ast}{= h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}^{\ast}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}^{\ast})$. Then, the $CS$ checks whether $B_{1}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}B_{1}$. If it is valid, the $CS$ authenticate $S_{j}$. After that, the $CS$ recovers $h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right)^{\ast}{= h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}^{\ast}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}^{\ast}\left| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}\left. \left| \middle| z \right) \middle| \middle| h\left( I \right. \right.D_{CS}{\left| \middle| y \right))}^{\ast} \oplus PSID_{j}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( z \middle| \middle| y \right) \oplus h(}T_{S}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}^{\ast}{) \oplus}D_{4}$. Then, the $CS$ computes $D_{5}^{\ast}{= h\left( PI \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}{||}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}^{\ast}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}^{\ast}{||}T_{S}^{new})^{\ast}$ and checks whether $D_{5}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}D_{5}$. If it is valid, the $CS$ have evidence of the connection attempt between $U_{MA}$ and $S_{j}$. To key agreement and mutual authentication, the $CS$ generates a random nonce $n_{CS}^{new}$ and computes the session key $SK_{MA - S}{= h\left( h \right.}\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right) \oplus h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right){\oplus h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{))}$. Then, the $CS$ computes $D_{6} = B_{2}{\oplus h(}T_{S}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}{) \oplus}T_{CS}^{new}$, $D_{7MA}{= h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{) \oplus h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{) \oplus h}\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right)$, $D_{8MA} = C_{2}{\oplus h(}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i}{) \oplus}T_{CS}^{new}$, $D_{9}{= h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{) \oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{) \oplus h}\left( n_{S}^{new} \right)$, $D_{10MA} = E_{SK}\left( h \right.\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right){\oplus h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}{||}B_{2}{))}$ and $D_{11MA} = E_{SK}\left( h \right.\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right){\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| PI \right.D_{i}{||}C_{2}{))}$. Finally, the $CS$ sends $\left\{ D_{6},D_{7MA},D_{10MA},D_{8MA},D_{9},D_{11MA} \right\}$ to the $S_{j}$.**Step** **4:**Upon getting the message from $CS$, the $S_{j}$ computes $T_{CS}^{new \ast} = B_{2}{\oplus h(}T_{S}^{new}\left| \middle| SI \right.D_{j}{) \oplus}D_{6}$, ${h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new})^{\ast} \oplus h\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right)^{\ast}{= h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}{||}T_{cs}^{new}{) \oplus}D_{7MA}$, $SK_{U - S}^{\ast}{= h\left( h \right.}\left( n_{MA}^{new} \right)^{\ast} \oplus h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right){\oplus h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{)^{\ast})}$ and decrypts $D_{SK \ast}\left( D_{10MA} \right) = h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right){\oplus h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| PSI \right.D_{j}{||}B_{2}{) = h}\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right)^{\ast}$. After that, the $S_{j}$ sends $\left\{ D_{6},D_{7MA},D_{10MA},D_{8MA},D_{9},D_{11MA} \right\}$ to the $U_{MA}$.**Step** **5:**Upon getting the messages from $S_{j}$, the $U_{MA}$ computes $T_{CS}^{new \ast} = C_{2}{\oplus h(}T_{MA}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i}{) \oplus}D_{8MA}$, ${h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new})^{\ast} \oplus h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right)^{\ast}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{) \oplus}D_{9}$, $SK_{MA - S}^{\ast}{= h\left( h \right.}\left( n_{U}^{new} \right) \oplus h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right)^{\ast}{\oplus h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{)^{\ast})}$ and decrypts $D_{SK \ast}\left( D_{11MA} \right) = h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right){\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| PI \right.D_{i}{||}C_{2}{) = h}\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right)^{\ast}$. For mutual authentication with $S_{j}$, the $U_{MA}$ computes $M_{9MA} =$$\{ E_{SK}\left( h( \right.n_{CS}^{new}{\left| \middle| serverValue\left( challenge \right) \right))\}}$ and sends $M_{9MA}$ to the $S_{j}$.**Step** **6:**Upon getting the messages from $U_{MA}$, the $S_{j}$ computes $D_{SK}\left( M_{9MA} \right)\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right)^{\ast}\left| \middle| serverValue \right.\left( challenge \right))$ and checks whether $h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right)^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right)$. Finally, the $S_{j}$ computes $M_{10MA} =$$\{ E_{SK}\left( serverValue\left( h \right. \right.\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right){||}T_{CS}^{new}{))\}}$ and sends $M_{10MA}$ to the $U_{MA}$.**Step** **7:**Upon getting the messages from $S_{j}$, the $U_{MA}$ computes $D_{SK}\left( M_{10MA} \right)$ = $serverValue\left( h\left( n_{CS}^{new} \right) \middle| \middle| T_{CS}^{new} \right) =$${h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new})^{\ast}$ and checks whether ${h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new})^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}{h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new})$.

$U_{MA}$ can successfully generates the login request message and session key between $U_{MA}$ and $S_{j}$. As a result, we show that Pelaez et al.'s scheme cannot withstand impersonation attack.

4.2. Session Key Disclosure Attack {#sec4dot2-sensors-19-03598}
----------------------------------

The session key disclosure attack is that a malicious adversary can obtain the session key between $U_{i}$ and $S_{j}$. Pelaez et al. claimed that their scheme can ensure security of session key because a malicious adversary cannot obtain random nonce $n_{U}^{new}$, $n_{S}^{new}$, $n_{CS}^{new}$ and current timestamp $T_{CS}^{new}$. However, according to [Section 1.1](#sec1dot1-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ can extract the data $\left\{ PID_{i},C_{2},C_{3},C_{4},h\left( n_{U} \right) \right\}$ stored in the smart card and can obtain the transmitted messages $D_{1},D_{2},T_{U}^{new},D_{8},D_{9}$ via an open channel. Therefore, a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ can easily compute session key $SK_{U - S}^{\ast}{= h\left( h \right.}\left( n_{U}^{new} \right)^{\ast} \oplus h\left( n_{S}^{new} \right){\oplus h(}n_{CS}^{new}{||}T_{CS}^{new}{)^{\ast})}$.

4.3. Replay Attack {#sec4dot3-sensors-19-03598}
------------------

Replay attack is that a malicious adversary try to obtain sensitive messages of user using the messages transmitted in previous and current session. Pelaez et al. claimed that their scheme can resist replay attack because a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain random nonce and timestamp. However, $U_{MA}$ can calculate the random nonce and timestamp of legitimate user correctly. According to 4.1, $U_{MA}$ also impersonates a legitimate user $U_{i}$. Therefore, $U_{MA}$ can obtain $n_{U}^{new}$, $n_{S}^{new}$ and $n_{CS}^{new}$ and timestamp $T_{U}^{new},$$T_{S}^{new}$ and $T_{CS}^{new}$. As a result, Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not withstand replay attack.

4.4. Mutual Authentication {#sec4dot4-sensors-19-03598}
--------------------------

Pelaez et al claimed that their protocol allows secure mutual authentication among the user $U_{i}$, the cloud server $S_{j}$, and the control server $CS$. However, according to [Section 3.1](#sec3dot1-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, their protocol does not withstand to impersonation attack, as a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ can successfully generate authentication request message $D_{2} = C_{3}{\oplus h(}T_{U}^{new}\left| \middle| I \right.D_{i}{) \oplus h}\left( n_{U}^{new} \right)$. Therefore, Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not achieve secure mutual authentication.

4.5. Anonymity {#sec4dot5-sensors-19-03598}
--------------

Pelaez et al claimed that a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain the real identity $ID_{i}$ of legitimate user. However, according to [Section 1.1](#sec1dot1-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ can extract the secret parameter $C_{2}$ stored in the smart card and can intercept the transmitted message $D_{1}$ via an open channel. $U_{MA}$ can also compute $ID_{i} = C_{2} \oplus D_{1}$ and easily obtain real identity of legitimate user $U_{i}$. Therefore, Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not guarantee anonymity.

5. Proposed Scheme {#sec5-sensors-19-03598}
==================

In this section, we propose a secure and lightweight three-factor authentication scheme for IoT in cloud computing environment to enhance security drawbacks of Pelaez et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme consists of three processes: registration, login and authentication, and password change. The details of each process are presented below.

5.1. User Registration Process {#sec5dot1-sensors-19-03598}
------------------------------

A new user $U_{i}$ who requests the use of the IoT services must register with control server $CS$. [Figure 5](#sensors-19-03598-f005){ref-type="fig"} shows the user registration process of proposed scheme and the detailed processes are as below. **Step** **1:**The $U_{i}$ selects $ID_{i}$ and $PW_{i}$ and imprints biometric $BIO_{i}$. After that, $U_{i}$ computes $\left\langle R_{i},P_{i} \right\rangle$=$Gen\left( BIO_{i} \right)$, $RPW_{i}{= h\left( P \right.}W_{i}{||}R_{i})$ and sends messages $\left\{ ID_{i},RPW_{i} \right\}$ to control server $CS$ via a secure channel.**Step** **2:**After getting the messages from $U_{i}$, the $CS$ generates a random nonce $S_{1}$ and computes $RID_{i}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| h( \right.S_{1}{||}K_{S}{))}$, $X_{i}{= h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}{||}K_{S}{||}S_{1})$, $A_{i} = X_{i}{\oplus h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$, and $B_{i}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$. Then, the $CS$ stores $\left\{ S_{1} \right\}$, $\left\{ A_{i},B_{i} \right\}$ in a database and smart card, respectively. The $CS$ sends $\left\{ RID_{i} \right\}$ and issues smart card to $U_{i}$ via a secure channel.**Step** **3:**After getting the message and smart card from $CS$, the $U_{i}$ computes $Q_{i}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| P \right.W_{i}{||}R_{i}{) \oplus RI}D_{i}$ and stores $\left\{ Q_{i} \right\}$ in a smart card $SC$.

5.2. Cloud Server Registration Process {#sec5dot2-sensors-19-03598}
--------------------------------------

A cloud server $S_{j}$ must register with the control server $CS$ to provide IoT service to the users. [Figure 6](#sensors-19-03598-f006){ref-type="fig"} shows the cloud server registration process of proposed scheme and the detailed processes are as below. **Step** **1:**The cloud server $S_{j}$ selects $SID_{j}$ and generates a random nonce $r_{j}$. After that, the $S_{j}$ sends messages $\left\{ SID_{j},r_{j} \right\}$ to the $CS$ via a secure channel.**Step** **2:**After getting the messages, the $CS$ generates a random nonce $S_{2}$ and computes $RSID_{j}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}{||}r_{j}{||}K_{S})$ and $SI_{j}{= h\left( RSI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| h( \right.S_{2}{||}K_{S}{))}$. Then, the $CS$ stores $\left\{ S_{2} \right\}$ in a database and sends messages $\left\{ RSID_{j},SI_{j} \right\}$ to the $S_{j}$ via a secure channel.**Step** **3:**After getting the messages, the $S_{j}$ stores $\left\{ RSID_{j},SI_{j} \right\}$ in a database.

5.3. Login and Authentication Process {#sec5dot3-sensors-19-03598}
-------------------------------------

A user $U_{i}$ who requests access to IoT service must send a login request message to the $CS$. [Figure 7](#sensors-19-03598-f007){ref-type="fig"} shows the login and authentication process of the proposed scheme. The detailed process is as below. **Step** **1:**The $U_{i}$ inputs $ID_{i}$, $PW_{i}$ and imprints biometric $BID_{i}$. Then, the $U_{i}$ calculates $R_{i}\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} Rep\left( BIO_{i},P_{i} \right)$, $RID_{i}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| P \right.W_{i}{||}R_{i}{) \oplus}Q_{i}$, $RPW_{i}{= h\left( P \right.}W_{i}{||}R_{i})$, $X_{i} = A_{i}{\oplus h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$ and $B_{i}^{\ast}{= h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$. The $U_{i}$ checks whether $B_{i}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}B_{i}$. If it is correct, the $U_{i}$ generates a random nonce $RU_{i}$. After that, the $U_{i}$ computes $M_{1} = RU_{i} \oplus X_{i}$, $CID_{i} = ID_{i}{\oplus h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$ and $M_{2}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}{||}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$ and sends login request messages $\left\{ M_{1},M_{2},CID_{i},RID_{i} \right\}$ to the $S_{j}$ via an open channel.**Step** **2:**Upon getting the messages from the $U_{i}$, the $S_{j}$ generates a random nonce $RS_{j}$ and computes $D_{1} = SI_{j} \oplus RS_{j}$, $CSID_{j} = SID_{j}{\oplus h\left( S \right.}I_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and $D_{2}{= h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.I_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$. Then, the $S_{j}$ sends the messages $\left\{ M_{1},M_{2},CID_{i},RID_{i},D_{1},D_{2},CSID_{j},RSID_{j} \right\}$ to the $CS$ via an open channel.**Step** **3:**Upon getting the messages from the $S_{j}$, the $CS$ computes $X_{i}{= h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}{||}K_{S}{||}S_{1})$, $RU_{i}\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} M_{1} \oplus X_{i}$, $ID_{i} = CID_{i}{\oplus h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$, and $M_{2}^{\ast}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}{||}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$ and checks whether $M_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}M_{2}$. If it is correct, the $CS$ computes $SI_{j}{= h\left( RSI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| h( \right.S_{2}{||}K_{S}{))}$, $RS_{j} = h\left( D_{1} \right) \oplus SI_{j}$, $SID_{j} = CSID_{j}{\oplus h\left( S \right.}I_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$, and $D_{2}^{\ast}{= h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.I_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and checks whether $D_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}D_{2}$. If it is valid, the $CS$ computes $M_{3} = RS_{j}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$, $D_{3} = RU_{i}{\oplus h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and $Q_{CS}{= h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.I_{j})$. Then, the $CS$ updates $RID_{i}$ to $RID_{i}^{new}$ and replaces $\left\{ RID_{i} \right\}$ with $\left\{ RID_{i}^{new} \right\}$. Finally, the $CS$ sends messages $\left\{ M_{3},D_{3},Q_{CS} \right\}$ to the $S_{j}$.**Step** **4:**Upon getting the messages from the $CS$, the $S_{j}$ computes $RU_{i} = D_{3}{\oplus h\left( SI \right.}D_{j}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and $Q_{CS}^{\ast}{= h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.I_{j})$ and checks whether $Q_{CS}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}Q_{CS}$. If it is valid, the $S_{j}$ computes $SK_{i}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and $Q_{CU}{= h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.K_{i})$ and sends messages $\left\{ M_{3},Q_{CU} \right\}$ to the $U_{i}$.**Step** **5:**Upon getting the messages from the $S_{j}$, the $U_{i}$ computes $RS_{j} = M_{3}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$, $SK_{i}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j})$ and $Q_{CU}^{\ast}{= h\left( R \right.}U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j}\left| \middle| S \right.K_{i})$ and checks whether $Q_{CU}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}Q_{CU}$. If it is correct, the $U_{i}$ computes $RID_{i}^{new}{= h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| h\left( R \right. \right.U_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.S_{j}{))}$ and $RID_{i}$ to $RID_{i}^{new}$. After that, the smart card updates $A_{i}^{new} = X_{i}{\oplus h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}^{new}{||}RPW_{i}$) and $Q_{i}^{new}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| P \right.W_{i}{||}R_{i}{) \oplus RI}D_{i}^{new}$ and replaces $\left\{ A_{i},Q_{i} \right\}$ with $\left\{ A_{i}^{new},Q_{i}^{new} \right\}$. As a result, the $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$ and $CS$ achieve the mutual authentication successfully.

5.4. Password Change Process {#sec5dot4-sensors-19-03598}
----------------------------

When $U_{i}$ wants to update his/her password, the $U_{i}$ can freely update their password in the proposed scheme. [Figure 8](#sensors-19-03598-f008){ref-type="fig"} shows the password change process of the proposed scheme. The detailed process is as below. **Step** **1:**The $U_{i}$ chooses $ID_{i}^{\ast}$, $PW_{i}^{\ast}$ and imprints biometrics $BIO_{i}^{\ast}$. Then, the $U_{i}$ calculates $\left\langle R_{i},P_{i} \right\rangle$=$Gen\left( BIO_{i}^{\ast} \right)$, $RPW_{i}^{\ast}{= h\left( P \right.}W_{MU}{||}R_{i})$ and sends $\left\{ ID_{MU}^{\ast},RPW_{i}^{\ast} \right\}$ to the smart card $SC$.**Step** **2:**After getting the message from $U_{i}$, the $SC$ computes $X_{i}^{\ast} = A_{i}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i}^{\ast})$ and $B_{i}^{\ast}{\mspace{600mu} = \mspace{600mu} h(}X_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i}^{\ast})$ and checks whether $B_{i}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}B_{i}$. If it is equal, the $SC$ sends the authentication message to the $U_{i}$.**Step** **3:**Upon getting the message from the $SC$, the $U_{i}$ inputs a new password $PW_{i}^{new}$ and imprints a new biometrics $BIO_{i}^{new}$. $U_{i}$ computes $\left\langle R_{i}^{new},P_{i}^{new} \right\rangle$=$Gen\left( BIO_{i}^{new} \right)$, $RPW_{i}^{new}{= h\left( P \right.}W_{i}^{new}{||}R_{i}^{new})$ and sends $\left\{ RPW_{i}^{new} \right\}$ to the $SC$.**Step** **4:**Upon getting the message from the $U_{i}$, the $SC$ computes $A_{i}^{new} = X_{i}^{\ast}{\oplus h\left( I \right.}D_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i}^{new})$, $B_{i}^{new}{= h(}X_{i}^{\ast}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i}^{new})$ and replaces $\left\{ A_{i},B_{i} \right\}$ with $\left\{ A_{i}^{new},B_{i}^{new} \right\}$.

6. Security Analysis {#sec6-sensors-19-03598}
====================

To assess secure mutual authentication of the proposed scheme, we utilize the BAN logic, which is widely accepted formal security model. Furthermore, we perform an informal security analysis to assess the safety of proposed scheme against various types of attacks.

6.1. Informal Security Analysis {#sec6dot1-sensors-19-03598}
-------------------------------

The security of the proposed scheme is accessed utilizing an informal security analysis. Our scheme can withstand against various types of attacks, including impersonation, replay, session key disclosure attacks, and allows secure mutual authentication and anonymity.

### 6.1.1. Impersonation Attack {#sec6dot1dot1-sensors-19-03598}

When a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ may attempt to impersonate a legitimate user, $U_{MA}$ must generate a login request message $M_{2}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}{||}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$ correctly. However, $U_{MA}$ cannot compute it because $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain $U_{i}$'s random nonce $RU_{i}$, real identity $ID_{i}$, and secret parameter $X_{i}$. Therefore, our scheme is secure against the impersonation attack because $U_{MA}$ cannot calculate a login request message successfully.

### 6.1.2. Replay Attack {#sec6dot1dot2-sensors-19-03598}

If a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ may attempt to impersonate legal user by resending messages transmitted in a previous session, $U_{MA}$ cannot utilize the previous messages because the $CS$ checks whether $M_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}M_{2}$ and $D_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}D_{2}$, respectively. Furthermore, our scheme can withstand replay attack by using dynamic random nonce $RU_{i}$ and $RS_{j}$ that are changed every session. Therefore, our scheme protects against replay attack.

### 6.1.3. Session Key Disclosure Attack {#sec6dot1dot3-sensors-19-03598}

In our scheme, a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ cannot compute session key $SK_{i}$ because $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain random nonce $RU_{i}$ and $RS_{j}$. In addition, $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain random nonce $RU_{i}$ and $RS_{j}$ without secret parameter $X_{i}$ and $SI_{j}$. Consequently, our scheme withstands the session key disclosure attack.

### 6.1.4. Smart card Stolen Attack {#sec6dot1dot4-sensors-19-03598}

According to [Section 1.1](#sec1dot1-sensors-19-03598){ref-type="sec"}, we suppose that a $U_{MA}$ can obtain a smart card and extract the data $\left\{ A_{i},B_{i},Q_{i} \right\}$ stored in the smart card. However, the $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain sensitive information $ID_{i}$ and $PW_{i}$ of legitimate user because the data stored in the smart card are protected $A_{i} = X_{i}{\oplus h\left( RI \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$, $B_{i}{= h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| RP \right.W_{i})$ and $Q_{i}{= h\left( I \right.}D_{i}\left| \middle| P \right.W_{i}{||}R_{i}{) \oplus RI}D_{i}$ by using a hash function and XOR operation.

### 6.1.5. Mutual Authentication {#sec6dot1dot5-sensors-19-03598}

In our scheme, after getting the request message $\left\{ M_{1},M_{2},CID_{i},RID_{i} \right\}$ from the $U_{i}$, the control server $CS$ checks whether $M_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}M_{2}$. If it is correct, $CS$ authenticates $U_{i}$. After getting the messages $\left\{ D_{1},D_{2},CSID_{j},RSID_{j} \right\}$ from cloud server $S_{j}$, the $CS$ checks whether $D_{2}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}D_{2}$. If it is equal, $CS$ authenticates $S_{j}$. After getting the messages $\left\{ M_{3},D_{3},Q_{CS} \right\}$ from the $CS$, the $S_{j}$ checks whether $Q_{CS}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}Q_{CS}$. If it is correct, $S_{j}$ authenticates $CS$. After getting the messages $\left\{ Q_{CU} \right\}$ from the $S_{j}$, the $U_{i}$ checks whether $Q_{CU}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}Q_{CU}$. Finally, the $U_{i}$ authenticates $S_{j}$. As a result, our scheme achieve secure mutual authentication among $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$, and $CS$ because a malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ does not know secret parameters $X_{i}$ and $SI_{j}$.

### 6.1.6. Anonymity {#sec6dot1dot6-sensors-19-03598}

A malicious adversary $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain the real identity $ID_{i}$ of legitimate user because it is masked by using hash function and XOR operation such as $CID_{i} = ID_{i}{\oplus h(}X_{i}\left| \middle| R \right.U_{i})$. In addition, the $U_{MA}$ cannot obtain secret parameter $X_{i}$ and random nonce $RU_{i}$. Consequently, our scheme provides anonymity.

6.2. Security Features {#sec6dot2-sensors-19-03598}
----------------------

We shows the better security levels achieved by the proposed scheme compared with some existing schemes \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598],[@B23-sensors-19-03598],[@B24-sensors-19-03598],[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]. The existing schemes are insecure against various attacks, including impersonation, session key disclosure smart card stolen, and replay attacks and cannot provide mutual authentication and anonymity. [Table 1](#sensors-19-03598-t001){ref-type="table"} shows the analysis results of the security features.

6.3. BAN Logic Based Authentication Proof {#sec6dot3-sensors-19-03598}
-----------------------------------------

We performed security analysis utilizing the BAN logic to demonstrate the secure mutual authentication of the proposed scheme. We present the BAN logic notations in [Table 2](#sensors-19-03598-t002){ref-type="table"}. Furthermore, we define the rules, the goals, the idealized form, and the assumptions for BAN logic analysis. We prove that the proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication among $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$ and $CS$.

### 6.3.1. BAN Logic Rules {#sec6dot3dot1-sensors-19-03598}

The rules of BAN logic are as below. Message meaning rule: $$\frac{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv A \right.\overset{K}{\leftrightarrow}B,\mspace{1350mu} A \vartriangleleft \left\{ X \right\}_{K}}{A\mspace{720mu}\left| {\equiv B\mspace{720mu}} \right| \sim X}$$Nonce verification rule: $$\frac{A\mspace{720mu}\left| {\equiv \#\left( X \right),\mspace{1350mu} A\mspace{720mu}} \right|\left. \equiv B\mspace{720mu} \middle| \sim X \right.}{A\mspace{720mu}\left| {\equiv B\mspace{720mu}} \right| \equiv X}$$Jurisdiction rule: $$\frac{\left. A\mspace{720mu}\left| {\equiv B\mspace{720mu}} \right|\Longrightarrow X,\mspace{1350mu} A\mspace{720mu}\left| {\equiv B\mspace{720mu}} \right| \equiv X \right.}{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv X \right.}$$Freshness rule: $$\frac{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv \#\left( X \right) \right.}{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv \# \right.\left( {X,Y} \right)}$$Belief rule: $$\frac{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv \right.\left( {X,Y} \right)}{\left. A\mspace{720mu} \middle| \equiv X. \right.}$$

### 6.3.2. Goals {#sec6dot3dot2-sensors-19-03598}

To assess the BAN logic proof, we present the goals of the proposed scheme as below. **Goal** **1:**$U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$**Goal** **2:**$S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$**Goal** **3:**$U_{i} \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$**Goal** **4:**$S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$

### 6.3.3. Idealized Forms {#sec6dot3dot3-sensors-19-03598}

To assess the BAN logic proof, we define the assumptions of the proposed scheme as below. *Msg*~1~:$\left. U_{i}\rightarrow S_{j} \right.$: $\left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$*Msg*~2~:$\left. S_{j}\rightarrow CS \right.$: $\left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i},RSID_{j},SID_{j},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$*Msg*~3~:$\left. CS\rightarrow S_{j} \right.$: $\left( ID_{i},SID_{j},RU_{i},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$*Msg*~4~:$\left. S_{j}\rightarrow U_{i} \right.$: $\left( ID_{i},RU_{i},RS_{j},\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right)_{X_{i}}$

### 6.3.4. Assumptions {#sec6dot3dot4-sensors-19-03598}

We present the initial assumptions to assess the BAN logic proof. *A*~1~:$S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{X_{i}}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$*A*~2~:$S_{j} \mid \equiv \#\left( RU_{i} \right)$*A*~3~:$CS \mid \equiv \left( CS\overset{SI_{j}}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$*A*~4~:$CS \mid \equiv \#\left( RS_{j} \right)$*A*~5~:$S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( CS\overset{SI_{j}}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$*A*~6~:$FA \mid \equiv \#\left( RS_{j} \right)$*A*~7~:$U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{X_{i}}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)$*A*~8~:$U_{i} \mid \equiv \#\left( RS_{j} \right)$*A*~9~:$\left. U_{i} \mid \equiv S_{j}\Rightarrow\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right.$*A*~10~:$\left. S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i}\Rightarrow\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right.$

### 6.3.5. Proof Using BAN Logic {#sec6dot3dot5-sensors-19-03598}

The proof then proceeds as below. **Step** **1:**According to $Msg_{1}$, we could get $$\left( S_{1} \right):S_{j} \vartriangleleft \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **2:**Using the message meaning rule with $S_{1}$ and $A_{1}$, we get $$\left( S_{2} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i} \mid \sim \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **3:**From the freshness rule with $S_{2}$ and $A_{2}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{3} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv \#\left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **4:**Using the nonce verification with $S_{2}$ and $S_{3}$, we get $$\left( S_{4} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **5:**From the belief rule with $S_{4}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{5} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( RU_{i} \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **6:**According to $Msg_{2}$, we could get $$\left( S_{6} \right):CS \vartriangleleft \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i},RSID_{j},SID_{j},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **7:**Using the message meaning rule with $S_{6}$ and $A_{3}$, we get $$\left( S_{7} \right):CS \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \sim \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i},RSID_{j},SID_{j},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **8:**From the freshness rule with $S_{7}$ and $A_{4}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{8} \right):CS \mid \equiv \#\left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i},RSID_{j},SID_{j},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **9:**Using the nonce verification rule with $S_{7}$ and $S_{8}$, we get $$\left( S_{9} \right):CS \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( RID_{i},ID_{i},RU_{i},RSID_{j},SID_{j},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **10:**According to $Msg_{3}$, we could get $$\left( S_{10} \right):S_{j} \vartriangleleft \left( ID_{i},SID_{j},RU_{i},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **11:**Using the message meaning rule with $S_{10}$ and $A_{5}$, we get $$\left( S_{11} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv CS \mid \sim \left( ID_{i},SID_{j},RU_{i},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **12:**From the freshness rule with $S_{11}$ and $A_{6}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{12} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv \#\left( ID_{i},SID_{j},RU_{i},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **13:**Using the nonce verification rule with $S_{11}$ and $S_{12}$, we get $$\left( S_{13} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv CS \mid \equiv \left( ID_{i},SID_{j},RU_{i},RS_{j} \right)_{SI_{j}}$$**Step** **14:**According to $Msg_{4}$, we could get $$\left( S_{14} \right):U_{i} \vartriangleleft \left( ID_{i},RU_{i},RS_{j},\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **15:**Using the message meaning rule with $S_{14}$ and $A_{7}$, we get $$\left( S_{15} \right):U_{i} \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \sim \left( ID_{i},RU_{i},RS_{j},\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **16:**From the freshness rule with $S_{15}$ and $A_{8}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{16} \right):U_{i} \mid \equiv \#\left( ID_{i},RU_{i},RS_{j},\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **17:**Using the nonce verification with $S_{15}$ and $S_{16}$, we get $$\left( S_{17} \right):U_{i} \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( ID_{i},RU_{i},RS_{j},\left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right) \right)_{X_{i}}$$**Step** **18:**From the belief rule with $S_{17}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{18} \right):U_{i} \mid \equiv S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)\left( \mathbf{Goal}3 \right)$$**Step** **19:**Using the jurisdiction rule with $S_{18}$ and $A_{9}$, we get $$\left( S_{19} \right):U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)\left( \mathbf{Goal}1 \right)$$**Step** **20:**Because of $SK = h\left( RU_{i} \middle| \middle| RS_{j} \right)$, from the $S_{5}$, $S_{9}$, $S_{13}$ and $S_{17}$ we could get $$\left( S_{20} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv U_{i} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)\left( \mathbf{Goal}4 \right)$$**Step** **21:**Using the jurisdiction rule with $S_{19}$ and $A_{10}$, we obtain $$\left( S_{21} \right):S_{j} \mid \equiv \left( U_{i}\overset{SK}{\longleftrightarrow}S_{j} \right)\left( \mathbf{Goal}2 \right)$$

Referring to Goals 1--4, we show that proposed scheme achieves secure mutual authentication among $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$ and $CS$.

7. Simulation for Security Verification with the AVISPA tool {#sec7-sensors-19-03598}
============================================================

We performed a formal security verification of the proposed scheme utilizing AVISPA simulation tool \[[@B26-sensors-19-03598],[@B27-sensors-19-03598]\] to evaluate the safety of the authentication protocol against MITM and replay attacks, which is widely accepted for formal security analysis \[[@B28-sensors-19-03598],[@B29-sensors-19-03598],[@B30-sensors-19-03598],[@B31-sensors-19-03598]\]. To perform AVISPA simulation tool, the environment and the session of security protocol must be implemented using the High Level Protocols Specification Language (HLPSL).

7.1. HLPSL Specifications {#sec7dot1-sensors-19-03598}
-------------------------

We considered three basic roles: user $U_{i}$, cloud server $S_{j}$, and control server $CS$. Then, we present $session$ and $environment$ utilizing HLPSL in [Figure 9](#sensors-19-03598-f009){ref-type="fig"}, which contains the security goals. The role specifications of $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$, and $CS$ are as shown in [Figure 10](#sensors-19-03598-f010){ref-type="fig"}, [Figure 11](#sensors-19-03598-f011){ref-type="fig"} and [Figure 12](#sensors-19-03598-f012){ref-type="fig"}.

The $U_{i}$ receives the initial message and updates the updates the state value from 0 to 1. The $U_{i}$ then sends the registration request messages $\left\{ ID_{i},RPW_{i} \right\}$ to the $CS$ via a secure channel and receives $\left\{ RID_{i},Smartcard \right\}$ from the $CS$. The $U_{i}$ updates the state value from 1 to 2. In the login and authentication phase, the $U_{i}$ declares $witness\left( UA,CS,ua\_ sn\_ rui,RU_{i}^{\prime} \right)$ from the $S_{j}$, and then updates the state value from 2 to 3. Finally, the $U_{i}$ receives the authentication messages $\left\{ M_{3},Q_{CU} \right\}$ from the $S_{j}$. The $U_{i}$ checks whether $Q_{CU}^{\ast}\overset{?}{=}Q_{CU}$. If it is valid, the $U_{i}$ authenticates the $S_{j}$ successfully. The role specification for $S_{j}$ is similarly defined.

7.2. AVISPA Simulation Result {#sec7dot2-sensors-19-03598}
-----------------------------

We show the AVISPA results to verify the safety of the proposed scheme using OFMC and CL-AtSe. The OFMC checks whether the proposed scheme is safe from MITM attack. In addition, the CL-AtSe demonstrates the safety of the protocol against replay attack. Consequently, [Figure 13](#sensors-19-03598-f013){ref-type="fig"} shows that the proposed scheme is secure against MITM and replay attacks though AVISPA simulation.

8. Performance Analysis {#sec8-sensors-19-03598}
=======================

We compared the computation cost, communication cost and security features of the proposed scheme with some existing schemes \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598],[@B23-sensors-19-03598],[@B24-sensors-19-03598],[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]. We show that the proposed scheme provides better efficiency and security features.

8.1. Computation Cost {#sec8dot1-sensors-19-03598}
---------------------

We compared the computation overheads of the proposed scheme with some existing schemes \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598],[@B23-sensors-19-03598],[@B24-sensors-19-03598],[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]. To analyze of computation cost, we estimated using the following parameters. [Table 3](#sensors-19-03598-t003){ref-type="table"} shows the analysis results of computation cost and the detailed total cost are as below.

The total computation cost for the proposed scheme and Pelaez et al.'s scheme are 34$T_{h}$ and 48$T_{h}$ + 8$T_{s}$, respectively. We provide better efficiency than some existing schemes because the proposed scheme uses only hash and XOR operations. Therefore, our scheme is secure and efficient for practical IoT-based cloud computing environment. $T_{h}$ denotes the time for the hash function (Case 1 $\approx 0.00517$ ms \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\] and Case 2 $\approx \mspace{600mu} 0.0000328$ ms \[[@B32-sensors-19-03598]\]).$T_{s}$ denotes the time for the symmetric key cryptography operation using AES algorithm (case 1 $\approx \mspace{600mu} 0.02148$ ms \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\] and Case 2 $\approx 0.0214385$ ms \[[@B32-sensors-19-03598]\]).The XOR operation was not included because it is negligible compared to the other operations.

8.2. Communication Cost {#sec8dot2-sensors-19-03598}
-----------------------

We compared the communication overhead of the proposed scheme with some existing schemes \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598],[@B23-sensors-19-03598],[@B24-sensors-19-03598],[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]. In authentication phase of the proposed scheme, the transmitted messages $\left\{ M_{1},M_{2},CID_{i},RID_{i} \right\}$, $\left\{ M_{1},M_{2},CID_{i},RID_{i},D_{1},D_{2},CSID_{j},RSID_{j} \right\}$, $\left\{ M_{3},D_{3},Q_{CS} \right\}$ and $\left\{ M_{3},Q_{CU} \right\}$ require (128 + 128 + 128 + 128 = 512 bits), (128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 + 128 = 1024 bits), (128 + 128 + 128 = 384 bits), and (128 + 128 = 256 bits), respectively. [Table 4](#sensors-19-03598-t004){ref-type="table"} shows the analysis results of communication cost. Consequently, the proposed scheme is thus more efficient than other related schemes \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598],[@B23-sensors-19-03598],[@B24-sensors-19-03598],[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\] because the total communications cost are 2176 bits (Case 1) and 4352 bits (Case 2). Case 1 defines that the pseudo-identity, random nonce, timestamp, identity, password, and hash function are 128 bits, respectively.Case 2 defines that the pseudo-identity, random nonce, timestamp, identity, password, and hash function are 256 bits, respectively.The block length for symmetric encryption is 128 bits.

9. Conclusions {#sec9-sensors-19-03598}
==============

This paper shows that Pelaez et al.'s scheme does not defend various attacks such as impersonation, session key disclosure and replay attacks. Furthermore, we show that Pelaez et al.'s scheme cannot allow mutual authentication and anonymity. We propose a secure and lightweight three-factor authentication scheme for IoT in cloud computing environment to enhance the security drawbacks of Pelaez et al.'s scheme. Our scheme can withstand various types of attacks, including impersonation, session key disclosure and replay attacks, and can provide mutual authentication and anonymity. Then, we demonstrate that our scheme allows secure mutual authentication among $U_{i}$, $S_{j}$, and $CS$ utilizing BAN logic analysis. We also performed a formal security verification analysis of the proposed scheme utilizing the AVISPA simulation tool. In addition, we compared the security features and performance of the proposed scheme with some existing schemes. We show that our scheme provides better safety and efficiency than related schemes. Therefore, our scheme can be suitable for practical IoT-based cloud computing environment because it is more secure and lightweight than the previous schemes.
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sensors-19-03598-t001_Table 1

###### 

Security features comparison.

  Security Features               Xue et al. \[[@B24-sensors-19-03598]\]   Amin et al. \[[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]   Zhou et al. \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\]   Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\]   Ours
  ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ------
  Impersonation attack            ×                                        ×                                         ×                                         ×                                          ∘
  Smart card stolen attack        ×                                        ×                                         ∘                                         ×                                          ∘
  Session key disclosure attack   ×                                        ∘                                         ×                                         ×                                          ∘
  Replay attack                   ∘                                        ∘                                         ×                                         ×                                          ∘
  Anonymity                       ×                                        ∘                                         ∘                                         ×                                          ∘
  Mutual authentication           ×                                        ∘                                         ×                                         ×                                          ∘

∘, preserves the security features; ×, does not preserve the security features;

sensors-19-03598-t002_Table 2

###### 

Notations for BAN logic.

  Notation                               Description
  -------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------
  $\left. A \middle| \equiv X \right.$   *A***believes** statement *X*
  \#X                                    Statement *X* is **fresh**
  $A \vartriangleleft X$                 *A***sees** statement *X*
  $\left. A \middle| \sim X \right.$     *A* once **said** *X*
  $\left. A\Rightarrow X \right.$        *A* has got **jurisdiction** of *X*
  $< X >_{Y}$                            *X* is **combined** with *Y*
  $\left\{ X \right\}_{K}$               *X* is **encrypted** under key *K*
  $A\overset{K}{\leftrightarrow}B$       *A* and *B* may use **shared key** *K* to communicate
  $SK$                                   Session key used in the current session

sensors-19-03598-t003_Table 3

###### 

A comparative summary: computation costs.

  Schemes                                    User                Cloud Server        Control Server       Total                Total Cost (Case 1)   Total Cost (Case 2)
  ------------------------------------------ ------------------- ------------------- -------------------- -------------------- --------------------- ---------------------
  Xue et al. \[[@B24-sensors-19-03598]\]     $12T_{h}$           $6T_{h}$            $18T_{h}$            $36T_{h}$            0.18612 ms            0.0011808 ms
  Amin et al. \[[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]    $12T_{h}$           $4T_{h}$            $14T_{h}$            $30T_{h}$            0.1551 ms             0.000984 ms
  Zhou et al. \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\]    $13T_{h}$           $7T_{h}$            $23T_{h}$            $43T_{h}$            0.22231 ms            0.0014104 ms
  Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\]   $9T_{h} + 3T_{s}$   $6T_{h} + 3T_{s}$   $33T_{h} + 2T_{s}$   $48T_{h} + 8T_{s}$   0.42 ms               0.1730824 ms
  Ours                                       $12T_{h}$           $6T_{h}$            $16T_{h}$            $34T_{h}$            0.17578 ms            0.0011152 ms

*T~h~*, hash function; *T~s~*, symmetric key cryptography operation using AES algorithm

sensors-19-03598-t004_Table 4

###### 

A comparative summary: communication costs.

  Schemes                                    Message Length   Total Cost (Case 1)   Total Cost (Case 2)
  ------------------------------------------ ---------------- --------------------- ---------------------
  Xue et al. \[[@B24-sensors-19-03598]\]     30               3840 bits             7680 bits
  Amin et al. \[[@B25-sensors-19-03598]\]    27               3456 bits             6912 bits
  Zhou et al. \[[@B23-sensors-19-03598]\]    34               4352 bits             8704 bits
  Pelaez et al. \[[@B8-sensors-19-03598]\]   34               4352 bits             8704 bits
  Ours                                       25               2176 bits             4352 bits
